Abstract. The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE) asks to distinguish "noisy" inner products of a secret vector with random vectors from uniform. In recent years, the LWE problem has found many applications in cryptography. In this paper we introduce (seemingly) much stronger adaptive assumptions, called "subspace LWE" (SLWE), where the adversary can learn the inner product of the secret and random vectors after they were projected into an adaptively and adversarially chosen subspace. We prove that SLWE mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as LWE using secrets of length d. We discuss some applications of the new subspace LWE problem to related-key attacks and to cryptosystems using weak random sources. In subsequent work the main result from this paper was used to construct new cryptosystems like efficient MACs whose security can be reduced to the LPN problem (LPN is LWE over a field of size 2.)
Introduction
The (computational) learning with errors problem (LWE) is specified by parameters , q ∈ N and an error distribution χ over Z q . It asks to find a secret vector s ∈ Z q given any number of "noisy" inner products of s with random vectors. Formally, these products are samples from a distribution Λ χ, (s) over Z +1 q which is defined by sampling a uniform r $ ← Z q and an error e ← χ, and outputting (r, r T s + e) (where multiplications and additions are all modulo q.)
An important special case of this problem is Regev's LWE problem [Reg05] where χ is a so called discrete Gaussian distribution and q is polynomial or exponential in a security parameter. Another important case is the learning parities with noise problem (LPN) where q = 2.
The decisional version of the LWE problem asks to distinguish samples of the form Λ χ, (s) from uniform (which might be easier than to actually output s as required by the computational version of the problem). The decisional LWE problem has been proven polynomially equivalent to the computational version if q is prime [Reg05] , and in particular for LPN [BFKL94, KS06] . In this paper we will always consider the decisional version of the problem, and we also only prove the main result for the case where q is prime.
Regev's LWE. The LWE problem has proven to be extremely useful to construct cryptographic schemes. One reason is its versatility, pretty much any cryptographic primitive know to date can be based on LWE. Another reason is its hardness. The best known algorithms against Regev's LWE (where χ is a discrete Gaussian and q = poly( )) need time and space 2 Θ( ) [BKW00] to recover s ∈ Z q , 1 and unlike for most other assumptions on which public-key crypto can be based, no faster quantum algorithms for the problem are known. But most strikingly, Regev's LWE is as hard as worst-case (standard) lattice assumptions [Reg05, Pei09] .
An incomplete list of cryptosystems whose security can be reduced to LWE is public-key encryption secure against chosen plaintext attacks [Reg05, KTX08, PVW08] and chosen ciphertext attacks [PW08, Pei09] , circular-secure encryption [ACPS09] , identity-based encryption [GPV08,CHKP10,ABB10a,ABB10b] and oblivious transfer [PVW08] , LPN. The learning with error (LPN) problem [BFKL94, BKW00, Kea93] is the special case of the LWE problem where q = 2 (i.e. we work over bits) and the error distribution is the Bernoulli distribution for some constant parameter τ, 0 < τ < 1/2, denoted Ber τ , and defined as Pr[x = 1 ; x ← Ber τ ] = τ . The LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of decoding random linear codes, a well studied question in coding theory. The LPN problem seems less versatile than the general LWE problem, and so far only "minicrypt" primitives (i.e. primitives known to be equivalent to one-way functions) were constructed under the LPN assumption. Alekhnovich [Ale03] constructs a public-key encryption scheme from a relaxed LPN assumption where the error τ is not constant but upper bounded as a function of as τ = O(1/ √ ). The Appeal of the LPN problem comes from the fact that LPN based schemes can be extremely efficient, just requiring relatively few bit-level operations to compute an inner product of two bit-vectors.
Constructions from LPN include PRGs [FS96] and encryption schemes [GRS08, ACPS09] , but by far most work has been done on efficient LPN based authentication schemes which we'll discuss in more detail in Section 4.
Subspace LWE. The LWE problem has been shown to be very robust with respect to leakage. Distinguishing LWE samples remains hard even if we the adversary can learn a function f (s) about the secret s as long as f (.) is compressing [AGV09] or hard to invert [DKL09,DGK + 10,GKPV10]. In this paper we show that the LWE problem is also very robust to tampering with the secret vector s and the randomness vector r (albeit not with the noise e.)
We define a (seemingly) much stronger adaptive version of LWE which we call "Subspace LWE", or SLWE for short. In the SLWE problem the adversary is not restricted to just ask for samples r, r T · s + e from Λ χ, (s) as in LWE, but has access to a more powerful oracle which she can query adaptively. The oracle takes as input the description of two affine mappings φ r , φ s : Z q → Z q and outputs a sample
An affine mapping φ r : Z q → Z q (similarly φ s ) is given by a matrix and a vector φ r = [X r ∈ Z × q , x r ∈ Z q ] and its evaluation is defined as
Without additional restrictions, the SLWE problem as just defined is easy to break. By choosing the input to the oracle appropriately, 2 one can e.g. We prove that the SLWE problem (using secrets in Z q and error distribution χ) is almost as hard as the standard (q, χ, d)-LWE problem with secrets of length d ≤ if the adversary is restricted in the sense that she is only allowed to query φ r , φ s which "overlap" in an d + δ (or more) dimensional subspace where δ ∈ N is a statistical security parameter. Formally this means X T r · X s must have rank at least d + δ. We call this the (q, χ, , d + δ)-SLWE problem. Let us mention that the other directionshowing that (q, χ, , d)-SLWE is at most as hard as (q, χ, d)-LWE -is trivial.
The precise statement of our result asserts that for any , d, δ ∈ N, d + δ ≤ , the (q, χ, , d + δ)-SLWE problem is at most an additive term 2/q δ+1 easier than the standard (q, χ, d)-LWE problem. For large fields, where q is superpolynomial, 2/q δ+1 is negligible already for δ = 0. For small fields, in particular the important case q = 2 as used in LPN, we must choose some δ > 0.
When q is not Prime. The reduction from SLWE to LWE assumes that q is prime, so Z q is a field and Z m q is a vector space. 3 The case where q is prime covers the cryptographically most interesting cases of LPN and Regev's LWE. Also the reduction from the search to decision version of LWE [Reg05] only works from prime q. The case where q is not prime has found cryptographic applications too. In particular, the case where q = p e for a prime p and e > 1 has been used in the construction of an encryption scheme with circular security [ACPS09] . The case where q is a product of distinct, small primes has been used in [Pei09] .
Applications of SLWE. In Section 4 we'll discuss some applications of the SLWE problem. In particular, the fact that SLWE is equivalent to LWE implies stronger security notions -like security against related-key attacks or security when using "weak" random sources -that one can give for existing schemes whose security is reduced to the LWE problem. In subsequent work, the hardness of SLPN has been used to construct efficient authentication schemes and even MACs from LPN. These schemes differ significantly from previous schemes which all were extensions of the Hopper-Blum protocol.
Outline. In Section 2 we first define the LWE and the new subspace LWE (SLWE) problem. In Section 3 we state and prove our main technical result (Theorem 1) which bounds the hardness of the SLWE problem in terms of the hardness of he standard LWE problem. In Section 4 we describe in more detail some applications of this result which were already mentioned in the introduction.
Hard Learning Problems

Notation
We denote the set of integers modulo an integer q ≥ 1 by Z q . We will use normal, bold and capital bold letters like x, x, X to denote single elements, vectors and matrices over Z q , respectively. For x ∈ Z q , |x| = denotes the length and wt(x) denotes the Hamming weight of the vector x, i.e. the number of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , |x|} where With I we denote the × identity matrix, i.e. I = I 1 .
The (Subspace) LWE Problem.
The (computational) learning with errors (LWE) problem is specified by parameters , q ∈ N and an error distribution χ over Z q . It asks to find a secret vector s ∈ Z q given any number of "noisy" inner products of s with random vectors. Formally, let Λ χ, (s) be the distribution over Z +1 q where a sample is given by
Let U m q denote the uniform distribution over Z m q and U q = U 1 q . The decisional LWE problem asks to distinguish samples from Λ χ, (s) with a uniform s from a random oracle (outputting U +1 q samples.) For any s, Λ Uq, (s) is the same as the uniform distribution U +1 q . It will be convenient for the proof to think of the random oracle as outputting samples from Λ Uq, (s) for some random s instead of U +1 q .
Definition 1 (Decisional Learning with Errors Problem (LWE))
. The (decisional) (q, χ, )-LWE problem is (t, Q, ε) hard if for every distinguisher D running in time t and making Q oracle queries,
Usually one defines the LWE problem by considering a distinguisher who gets a polynomial number of samples as input and not access to an oracle (which doesn't take inputs anyway.) We use this oracle based definition so it is more similar to the SLWE problem we define below, where the oracle does take adaptively chosen inputs. An affine projection φ : Z q → Z q is given by a matrix/vector tuple X ∈ Z × q , x ∈ Z q and defined as φ(v)
otherwise. With Γ χ, ,d (s, .) we denote the oracle which on input φ r , φ s outputs a sample of Γ χ, ,d (s, φ r , φ s ).
Definition 2 (Subspace Learning with Errors Problem (SLWE)
). The (decisional) (q, χ, , d)-SLWE problem is (t, Q, ε) hard if for every distinguisher D running in time t and making Q oracle queries,
Note that the Γ Uq, ,d (s., ) oracle outputs ⊥ if queried on an input where rank(X T r X s ) < d and a uniform sample U +1 q otherwise. In particular, like Λ Uq, (s), the output distribution of Γ Uq, ,d (s., ) is independent of s.
The Hardness of SLWE
Theorem 1 below is the main technical result stating that the SLWE problem mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as the standard LWE problem with secrets of length d. But let's first look at the (easy) other direction as stated by Claim 1 below. t, ) hard where s = s − poly(t, ).
Proof (of Claim).
To prove this claim we will show how, for any error distribution χ , on can efficiently generate (q, χ , d)-LWE samples which have distribution Λ χ ,d (s ) (for some uniform s ∈ Z d q ) given access to a (q, χ , , d)-SLWE oracle Γ χ , ,d (s, .) (for some uniform s ∈ Z q .) We do so without known knowing the distribution χ or s.
Given such a transformation, we then can use any distinguisher D who breaks the (q, χ, d)-LWE assumption with advantage as defined in eq.(1), to break the (q, χ, , d)-SLWE assumption as in eq.(2) with the same advantage by simply transforming the SLWE samples (where the oracle uses either the error distribution χ = χ or χ = U +1 q , but we don't know which) to LWE samples (with the same unknown error distribution χ ) before forwarding them do D.
= 0 and X s = X r = I v (recall that I v is the the zero matrix with a 1 in the first d diagonal entries.) The output of the SLWE oracle on these queries are samples of the form
+e where e ← χ , r $ ← Z q from which we then get an Λ χ ,d (s ↓v ) sample r ↓v , r T ↓v s ↓v + e by replacing r with r ↓v . Note that these samples have the right distribution, which means s ↓v and the q r ↓v 's are uniformly random as required. This is easy to see recalling that s and the q r's are uniform.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we'll need the following simple technical Lemma: Lemma 1. For q, d, δ ∈ N, let ∆(q, d, δ) denote the probability that a random matrix in Z d+δ,d q has rank less than d, then
Proof. Assume we sample the d columns of a matrix M ∈ Z d+δ,d q one by one. For i = 1, . . . , d let E i denote the event that the first i columns are linearly independent, then
as ¬E i happens iff the ith column (sampled uniformly from a space of size q d+δ ) falls into the space (of size q i−1 ) spanned by the first i − 1 columns. We get further is (s , t, ) hard where
Proof (of Theorem 1). To prove the theorem we will show how to sample outputs of an SLWE oracle Γ χ , ,d+δ (ŝ, .) for some uniformly randomŝ ∈ Z q and adversarially chosen inputs, given only standard LWE samples Λ χ ,d (s) for some uniform s ∈ Z d q . This sampling is done without knowing s or the error distribution χ .
Given such a transformation, we then can use any distinguisher D who breaks the (q, χ, , d+δ)-SLWE assumption with advantage to break the standard (q, χ, d)-LWE assumption with the same advantage, minus the probability that the transformation will fail (which, unlike in the previous claim, is non-zero.)
Recall that an LWE sample
For X r , X s ∈ Z × q , x s , x r ∈ Z q , we'll show how to transform such a sample into a an SLWE sample Γ χ , ,d+δ (ŝ, [X r , x r , X s , x s ]). If rank(X T r · X s ) < d + δ this sample is simply ⊥, so from now one we assume that this rank is at least d + δ, in this case the sample has the form r, (X r ·r + x r )
T · (X s ·ŝ + x s ) + e where e ← χ r
In our transformation, the SLWE secretŝ ∈ Z q is defined as a function of the LWE secret s ∈ Z d q as follows
Note that we only know R, b (which we sampled), but will not getŝ as we don't know s. Also note thatŝ is uniformly random as it is blinded with a uniform b. Define the set L ⊆ Z q , which is the set of solutions to a system of linear equations, as
If X T r ·X s ·R has rank at least d, then L is not empty as the linear equation considered in eq.(6) is (over)defined (we will bound the probability that the rank is d later.) In this case the LWE sample is transformed into an SLWE sample as r, r T · s + e As T ↓t is a full rank square matrix eq.(8) defines a bijection betweenr ↓t and r. As r is chosen uniformly at random, alsor ↓t is uniformly random. Thus the entirer is uniform as claimed.
